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We present the wavelength attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution
system with a heterodyne protocol, in which the transmittance of beam splitters at Bob’s station
is wavelength-dependent. Our strategy is proposed independent of but analogous to that of Huang
et al. [arXiv: 1206.6550v1 [quant-ph]], but in that paper the shot noise of the two beams that Eve
sends to Bob, transmitting after the homodyne detector, is unconsidered. However, shot noise is
the main contribution to the deviation of Bob’s measurements from Eve’s when implementing the
wavelength attack, so it must be considered accurately. In this paper, we firstly analyze the solutions
of the equations specifically that must be satisfied in this attack, which is not considered rigorously
by Huang et al. Then we calculate the shot noise of the homodyne detector accurately and conclude
that the wavelength attack can be implemented successfully in some parameter regime.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 42.50.–p, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution
(CVQKD), which is an alternative to single-photon
quantum-key distribution (QKD), has many advan-
tages, such as high repetition rate of communication,
high detection efficiency, and ease of integration with
standard telecom components, so it has received much
more attention in recent years [1–7]. However, because
there exist some imperfections such as loss or noise in
practical system, actually the unconditional security
of the final key of QKD may be compromised. It has
been extensively investigated in single-photon QKD,
such as photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack, passive
Faraday-mirror attack and parially random phase attack
etc. [8–12], but not the case in CVQKD [13, 14]. This
is because the system of CVQKD is a one-way commu-
nication system and needs fewer optical elements than
two-way system. Furthermore, most of intervention
of Eve on the system of CVQKD can be detected by
the parameter estimation of classical postprocessing of
CVQKD.
In Ref. [15], the wavelength-dependent property of a
beam splitter (BS) was exploited by eavesdropper Eve
to attack single-photon QKD successfully. Subsequently,
Huang et al extended this attack, the so-called wave-
length attack, to the all-fiber system of CVQKD [16].
However, in that paper, two significant problems are not
considered. First, the equation that must be satisfied in
this attack, so-called attacking equation, was not solved
specifically in some permitted parameter regime, which
may make this attack invalid. Second, the shot noise
of the two beams that Eve sends to Bob, when trans-
mitting through the homodyne detector, was neglected.
However, shot noise is the main contribution to the de-
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viation of Bob’s measurements from Eve’s when imple-
menting the wavelength attack, so it must be considered
accurately.
In this paper, we demonstrate and resolve these two
problems, and then we improve the wavelength attack
method against the all-fiber CVQKD system by tuning
the attacking parameter’s regime. Finally, we conclude
that the wavelength attack will be implemented success-
fully in some parameter regime. The paper is organized
as follows: In Sec. II, we demonstrate the wavelength at-
tack and solve the attacking equations specifically. Then,
we analyze the shot noise introduced by the one-port
and two-port homodyne detectors and calculate the con-
ditional variance between the two legitimate parties Al-
ice and Bob considering the deviations introduced by the
shot noise. Finally, in Sec. III, we discuss and make some
conclusions about the feasibility of this wavelength attack
on a practical CVQKD system based on the conditional
variance obtained in Sec. II B.
II. WAVELENGTH ATTACK ON PRACTICAL
CVQKD SYSTEM
A. Scheme of wavelength attack
In a practical CVQKD system, Alice first modulates a
coherent state (xˆA, pˆA) by amplitude and phase modu-
lators according to bivariate Gaussian distributions cen-
tered on (xA, pA) of variance VAN0, where N0 is the shot-
noise variance that appears in the Heisenberg relation
∆x∆p ≥ N0 [3],
xˆA = xA + xˆ
A
N , pˆA = pA + pˆ
A
N . (1)
〈(xˆAN )2〉 = N0, 〈(pˆAN )2〉 = N0. Subsequently, she sends
this state to Bob through a quantum channel optical fiber
and Bob implements a homodyne or heterodyne detec-
tion after receiving this state. So, after many repetitions,
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Wavelength attack setup on a practi-
cal CVQKD system with heterodyne detection (dashed line
indicates signal beam and solid line denotes the local oscilla-
tor) [16]. LD, laser diode; AM: amplitude modulator; PM,
phase modulator; FM, Faraday mirror; PBS, polarization
beam splitter; PC, polarization controller; D, photodetector;
and BS1-5, beam splitters. BS2-5 have the same wavelength-
dependent property, i.e., when the signal beam (local oscilla-
tor) transmits through them, all of their respective transmit-
tance are T1(T2). BS1 is a beam splitter at Alice’s side and
is not necessarily wavelength dependent.
Alice and Bob can share trains of correlated data and
then get the final key after the classical data postprocess-
ing procedure. However, because the practical system
may have some imperfections which will leave a loophole
for the potential eavesdropper Eve, we must calibrate the
system carefully and make efforts to eliminate all the ex-
isting loopholes.
Generally, the transmittance of some practical beam
splitters depends on the wavelength of beams, namely
T = F 2 sin2( cwλ
2.5
F
) ≡ T (λ), where F 2 is the maximal
power that is coupled, c is the coupling coefficient, and ω
is the heat source width [17, 18]. Consequently, proposed
in Ref. [16], Eve can use this wavelength-dependent prop-
erty to attack the practical CVQKD system with hetero-
dyne protocol shown in Fig. 1. She can send two beams
whose wavelength and intensity can be tuned to control
Bob’s measurement results, which are made identical to
Eve’s.
Specifically speaking, Eve first intercepts Alice’s send-
ing states and makes a heterodyne detection on them, so
she can get the quadratures xE , pE, which can be given
by
xˆE = xˆA + xˆ
E
N , pˆE = pˆA + pˆ
E
N , (2)
where 〈(xˆEN )2〉 = N0, 〈(pˆEN )2〉 = N0 is the shot noise
introduced by Eve’s heterodyne detection. Then, she
sends to Bob two beams whose intensities are denoted
as |α′S |2 and |α′LO|2 respectively. Because the interfer-
ence between these two beams is destroyed, Eve might be
able to control the intensities and wavelengths of them
to make these two beams, after transmitting Bob’s het-
erodyne detectors, satisfy
(1−T1)(1−2T1)|α′S |2−(1−T2)(1−2T2)|α′LO|2=
√
ηxE |αLO|,
T1(1 − 2T1)|α′S |2 − T2(1− 2T2)|α′LO|2 =
√
ηpE |αLO|,
(3)
where T1(T2) represents the transmittance of a practical
beam splitter corresponding to the beam α′S(α
′
LO) whose
wavelength is λ1(λ2). αLO is the amplitude of local oscil-
lator in the absence of this wavelength attack, and η is the
channel loss. After scaling with
√
2αLO [16], then, Bob
will get measurements
√
ηxE/
√
2 and
√
ηpE/
√
2. Thus,
the wavelength attack may succeed; however, whether
Eqs. (3) have the real solutions in the practical parame-
ter regime determines the validity of this wavelength at-
tack. So, in what follows we analytically investigate the
solutions of Eqs. (3) in the permitted parameter regime.
First, we rewrite Eqs. (3) as
(1−T1)(1−2T1)|α′S |2=
√
ηxE |αLO|+(1−T2)(1−2T2)|α′LO|2,
T1(1 − 2T1)|α′S |2 =
√
ηpE |αLO|+ T2(1− 2T2)|α′LO|2.
(4)
Provided that α′LO is the same as αLO, then T2 is 1/2 and
Eqs. (4) will be reduced to
(1 − T1)(1 − 2T1)|α′S |2 =
√
ηxE |αLO|,
T1(1 − 2T1)|α′S |2 =
√
ηpE |αLO|.
(5)
As Ref. [16] says, generally xE , pE are very small in prac-
tical implementation of CVQKD, and Eqs. (5) are always
solvable if xE , pE are both positive or negative at the
same time. That is,
1− T1
T1
=
xE
pE
, T1 =
pE
xE + pE
∈ [0, 1]. (6)
However, when xE , pE are different in sign, T1∈[0, 1], but
by virtue of opting for an appropriate T2 (6= 1/2), we
are always able to confirm both the right-hand sides of
Eqs. (4) as being either positive or negative at the same
time, because both the second terms on the right-hand
sides of Eqs. (4) are the same in sign. Hence, Eqs. (4) or
Eqs. (3) always hold if we select appropriate α′LO.
Additionally, we point out that we can always make
the-right hand side of Eqs. (4) sufficiently small and T2
close to 1/2; thus |α′S |2 in the left-hand of Eqs. (4) can
always be small too, especially in discrete modulation
protocol of CVQKD [4, 5] in which the signal intensity
is always on a single-photon level. Consequently, this at-
tack cannot be avoided efficiently even if Bob added a
wavelength filter on his system before detectors, which is
the same case in Ref. [15]. This is because such extremely
weak signal is still able to transmit through the practi-
cal filter just by increasing the intensity of the incoming
light, and the wavelength of the fake local oscillator can
be close to the original one which is 1550 nm. The laser
after transmitting through the practical filter is permit-
ted to have a line width, so the fake local oscillator cannot
be filtered either.
3Consequently, by implementing this wavelength at-
tack, theoretically Eve can control her attacking param-
eters to make Bob’s measurements identical to hers, or
rather Eve completely knows Bob’s measurements. How-
ever, in Eqs. (3) we do not consider the interference be-
tween Eve’s sending beams and vacuum mode entering
from other ports of Bob’s beam splitters, as Fig. 1 shows.
This interference could introduce excess noise into Bob’s
measurements, thus leading them to deviate from Eve’s.
We demonstrate this in the next section.
B. Deviation of Bob’s measurements from Eve’s
and Alice’s
As the previous section demonstrated, the interference
with vacuum mode will lead Bob’s measurements to de-
viate from Eve’s. If the deviation is unfortunately large,
Alice and Bob will find that they cannot distill any se-
cure keys because Bob’s measurements are too noisy af-
ter comparing partial data within parameter-estimation
phase of data postprocessing. So, we must calculate
the conditional variance between Alice and Bob to see
whether Eve’s wavelength attack could be successful. We
point out that the shot noise introduced by Bob’s detec-
tors is the main contribution to the conditional variance,
which is not noted in Ref. [16]. We begin this calculation
by analyzing the quantum noise of unbalanced homodyne
detectors first and apply the results to Bob’s apparatus.
1. Quantum noise on unbalanced homodyne detector
Pulsed homodyne detector is extensively exploited to
measure a weak signal with a bright local oscillator [19–
21]. As depicted in Fig. 2, when the transmittance of
beam splitter T = 1/2, the homodyne detector is bal-
anced homodyne detector (BHD), or unbalanced homo-
dyne detector (UBHD). Figure 2(a) shows two-port ho-
modyne detector with a subtractor, and Fig. 2(b) shows
one-port homodyne detector without a subtractor. Those
two-port or one-port homodyne detector can be used to
measure a weak signal’s quadratures or vacuum state’s
quantum noise.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Unbalanced homodyne detector with
(a) two-port or (b) one-port.
Generally, two-port balanced homodyne detector can
measure the quadratures xA or pA of weak signal αS , and
between αS and the local oscillator the relative phase is
θ. The measurement is
xθ = 2|αLO|(xin cos θ + pin sin θ), (7)
and xin = xA + xN , pin = pA + pN . xN , pN are the
vacuum mode quadratures, of which the variance is N0
[21]. The variance of xin, pin is
〈x2in〉 = 〈x2A〉+ 〈x2N 〉 = VA +N0,
〈p2in〉 = 〈p2A〉+ 〈p2N 〉 = VA +N0,
(8)
where VA is the signal’s variance. When VA = 0, the out-
put is the shot noise N0 [22]. However, with unbalanced
two-port homodyne detector, the measurement will be
different from the one in Eq. (7). The following is the
analysis of this case.
Since the strong local oscillator can be treated as a
classical field [19–21], the amplitude of it can be denoted
as
αLO = |αLO|eiθ, (9)
where θ is the relative phase in Eq. (7). Provided the
pulsed local oscillator αLO and signal beam αS have the
same optical frequency and are all in the coherent state
respectively, they will interfere with each other when
transmitting through the beam splitter [cf. Fig. 2(a)];
i.e., after optical mixing, their intensity can be written
as
I1 = |
√
1− TαS +
√
TαLO|2 = (1− T )|αS |2 + T |αLO|2 +
√
T (1− T )(α∗SαLO + α∗LOαS)
= (1− T )|αS |2 + T |αLO|2 +
√
T (1− T )× 2|αLO|(xin cos θ + pin sin θ),
I2 = |
√
TαS −
√
1− TαLO|2 = T |αS|2 + (1− T )|αLO|2 −
√
T (1− T )(α∗SαLO + α∗LOαS)
= T |αS|2 + (1− T )|αLO|2 −
√
T (1− T )× 2|αLO|(xin cos θ + pin sin θ),
(10)
where we have denoted
αS+α
∗
S
2
,
αS−α
∗
S
2i
by xin, pin, respec-
tively. Then, with the subtraction of I1 and I2, the out-
put of two-port UBHD can be obtained as
Xθ = 2
√
T (1− T )xθ + (1− 2T )(|αS |2 − |αLO|2), (11)
4where xθ has been given by Eq. (7) and when T = 1/2
Eq. (11) is reduced to Eq. (7). If the weak signal is a
vacuum state, the amplitude of it can be read as αS =
〈αS〉+δαS , and 〈αS〉= 0, so xA = pA = 0 and |αS |2 =
|δαS |2 ≡ |δα|2 << |αLO|2. δα describes the amplitude
fluctuation of the vacuum state. Thus, we can neglect its
square terms, so the output of UBHD is
Xθ = 2
√
T (1− T )x′θ − (1 − 2T )|αLO|2, (12)
where x′θ is obtained from Eq. (7) by xA = pA = 0. When
θ is selected to be 0 or pi/2, we can get the shot noise of
the output 4T (1 − T )N0 denoted as (∆X)2 or (∆P )2
[(∆X)2 = (∆P )2 = 4T (1 − T )N0], which is consistent
with the one of BHD output when T = 1/2. The sec-
ond term of the right-hand of Eq. (12) is the two ports’
subtraction of the intensity of the local oscillator because
of the unbalanced splitting rate of the asymmetric beam
splitter (ABS).
Subsequently, let us analyze the unbalanced one-port
homodyne detector. As shown in Fig. 2(b), the inten-
sity of local oscillator or signal after transmitting the
unbalanced beam splitter has been obtained already by
Eq. (10). When the weak signal is a vacuum state, the
intensity of Eq. (10) can be reduced to
I1 = T |αLO|2 + 2
√
T (1− T )|αLO|XN ,
I2 = (1− T )|αLO|2 − 2
√
T (1− T )|αLO|XN ,
(13)
where XN ∈ {xN , pN} and θ has been selected to be 0 or
pi/2. The right-hand side of each of Eqs. (13), except for
the first term, which is the unbalanced part of splitting
of the bright local oscillator because of the asymmet-
ric splitting rate of ABS, is the fluctuation of each port
of unbalanced one-port homodyne detector respectively.
With the two-port or one-port UBHD, we can compute
the noise of the beams Eve sends to Bob in the next sec-
tion. However, keep in mind that the noise of UBHD
is introduced by the vacuum state from the other input
port of the asymmetric beam splitter of UBHD.
2. Conditional variance between Alice and Bob
By looking back at Fig. 1 again, it is clear that there
are two types of UBHD at Bob’s station. On one hand,
the first kind of ABS (BS2 and BS3), through which the
signal or local oscillator transmits alone, can be viewed as
a one-port UBHD, and each port output is the interfer-
ence between the vacuum state and either signal or local
oscillator. So, as analyzed in Sec. II B 1, the intensity of
the first kind of ABS output is (taking the signal beam
as an example and the local oscillator as analogous),
IrS = (1− T1)IS − 2
√
T1(1− T1)ISXN ,
ItS = T1IS + 2
√
T1(1− T1)ISXN .
(14)
IS is the intensity of the signal beam Eve sends (IS =
|α′S |2). On the other hand, the second kind of ABS (BS4
and BS5) is a two-port UBHD, but the output is the
interference between signal beam and vacuum state in
addition to the one between local oscillator and vacuum
state, because the wavelengths of signal beam and local
oscillator are different from each other and they cannot
interfere with each other. Recall that the shot-noise am-
plitude of the two-port UBHD output is ∆XT or ∆PT
as shown in Eq. (12). Scaled with
√
2|αLO| [cf. Eq. (7),
generally, for heterodyne detection local oscillator is split
into two beams so its intensity should be divided by two],
the measurements of Bob’s detection are
xˆB =
∆i√
2q|αLO|
=
(1− 2T1)IrS − (1− 2T2)IrLO + 2
√
IrS∆XS + 2
√
IrLO∆XLO√
2|αLO|
=
√
η
2
xˆE +
(1− 2T1)[−2
√
T1(1− T1)ISXN ]− (1− 2T2)[−2
√
T2(1− T2)ILOXN ] + 2
√
IrS∆XS + 2
√
IrLO∆XLO√
2|αLO|
=
√
η
2
xˆE + xˆB|E ,
pˆB =
∆i√
2q|αLO|
=
(1− 2T1)ItS − (1− 2T2)ItLO + 2
√
ItS∆PS + 2
√
ItLO∆PLO√
2|αLO|
=
√
η
2
pˆE +
(1−2T1)[2
√
T1(1−T1)ISXN ]−(1−2T2)[2
√
T2(1−T2)ILOXN ] + 2
√
ItS∆PS + 2
√
ItLO∆PLO√
2|αLO|
=
√
η
2
pˆE + pˆB|E ,
(15)
where ∆i is the photocurrent subtraction of two port
outputs of UBHD proportional to the intensity difference
of two beams and the proportional constant is q. xˆB|E
5or pˆB|E is the deviation of xˆB or pˆB from xˆE or pˆE . The conditional variance of Bob’s measurements conditioned
on Eve’s can be computed as
V xB|E =〈xˆ2B|E〉
=
〈{(1−2T1)[−2
√
T1(1−T1)ISXN ]}2〉+〈{(1−2T2)[−2
√
T2(1−T2)ILOXN ]}2〉+4IrS(∆XS)2+4IrLO(∆XLO)2
2|αLO|2
≈ 2T2(1 − T2)(1 − 2T2)
2ILON0 + 2(1− T2)ILO[4T2(1− T2)N0]
|αLO|2
≈ 2T2(1 − T2)(1 − 2T2)2N0 + 8T2(1 − T2)2N0 ,
V p
B|E ≈ V xB|E ≡ VB|E .
(16)
The first approximate equality holds because IS , I
r
S <<
|αLO|2, and the last equality of V xB|E can be reduced for
providing that the intensity of the fake local oscillator
(ILO = |α′LO|2) that Eve sends is the same as that of
the original local oscillator (|αLO|2). Under this assump-
tion, V p
B|E is equivalent to V
x
B|E and both of them can be
denoted as VB|E for short.
In order to obtain the conditional variance (VB|A) of
Bob’s measurements conditioned on Alice’s random op-
tional Gaussian variables xA or pA, we can substitute
Eqs. (1) and (2) into Eq. (15) to achieve Bob’s measure-
ments about Alice’s mode. That’s
xˆB =
√
η
2
(xA + xˆ
A
N + xˆ
E
N ) + xˆB|E ,
pˆB =
√
η
2
(pA + pˆ
A
N + pˆ
E
N ) + pˆB|E.
(17)
Then, we can get the conditional variance VB|A
VB|A = 〈(xˆB −
√
η/2xA)
2〉 = ηN0 + VB|E . (18)
Interestingly, it’s clear that VB|E is always smaller than
VB|A, so the information between Bob and Eve is al-
ways much larger than that between Bob and Alice. This
is consistent with the intercept-and-resend strategy; i.e.,
when implementing this wavelength attack, Eve totally
knows Bob’s measurements except for some small devia-
tions. We analyze this deviation accurately and investi-
gate how Eve hides herself with this attack in the next
section.
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As shown in previous sections, if Eve implements this
wavelength attack against Bob’s practical system, the
conditional variance VB|E in Eq. (16) versus the transmit-
tance T2 (corresponding to the local oscillator) of ABS
on Bob’s side is plotted in Fig. 3.
When T2 equals 0.15 or 0.5, VB|E will be N0 and can
reach the maximum value 1.24N0 when T2 equals 0.3. In
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Conditional variance VB|E vs the trans-
mittance T2 of ABS on Bob’s side. Inset shows the first term
(top) and the second term (bottom) of VB|E in Eq. (16).
practical heterodyne protocol of CVQKD, the secure con-
ditional variance VB|A is alwaysN0 except for some small
excess noise εN0. Consequently, Eve must select appro-
priate T2, making VB|E equal (1−η)N0, and then she can
hide herself completely and get all information between
Alice and Bob. Moreover, as discussed in Sec. II, different
values of T2 can always make Eq. (3) satisfied; namely
Eve could implement this wavelength attack successfully
in any case. Besides, from Eq. (16), it can be seen that
the main contribution to conditional variance VB|E is the
shot noise of two beams (especially local oscillator |α′LO|2,
|α′S |2 << |α′LO|2, so the shot noise contributed by weak
signal α′S can be neglected) when transmitting through
the two-port UBHD. The noise introduced by the first
kind of ABS of Bob’s side (as one-port UBHD) (Fig. 3
upper inset) is very small (< 0.15N0) and signal’s contri-
bution can be neglected because of the large denomina-
tor |αLO|2 proportional to 108N0 [3]. Additionally, if Eve
could reduce the intensity of two sending beams which
are both smaller than the original local oscillator |αLO|2,
6the conditional variance VB|E can be decreased to any
extent because the shot noise, after being enlarged by
the intensity of beam α′S or α
′
LO, becomes small. For
this purpose and not being found, Eve can exploit the
wavelength-dependent property of additional monitoring
ABS (splitting rate may be 1:99) to make the monitor
recording the intensity of the beam α′S or α
′
LO be un-
changed.
In conclusion, we investigate the feasibility of a wave-
length attack combined with the intercept-resend method
on practical CVQKD system with heterodyne protocol
and conclude that this attack will be implemented suc-
cessfully if we choose appropriate transmittance T2 corre-
sponding to the appropriate wavelength of the fake local
oscillator. This attack can be implemented successfully
due to several reasons. First, we analyzed the solution
of equations that two sending beams by Eve satisfied,
and it can be clearly seen that the solutions satisfying
all conditions exist. Second, the main contribution of
deviation of Bob’s measurements from Eve’s is due to
the fake local oscillator’s enlarging shot noise and can
be reduced by selecting appropriate transmittance T2 or
decreasing the intensity of fake local oscillator. These
two aspects are not considered in Ref. [16], which may
make their scheme invalid in some parameter regimes.
Last but not least, all of the practical beam splitters at
Bob’s station have the same wavelength-dependent prop-
erty. However, if Bob inserts optical filters on his system
before receiving the light, this attack cannot be avoided
efficiently, as analyzed in Sec. II A, which is considered to
be impossible in Ref. [16]. So, using high-quality filters
and wavelength-independent beam splitters in practical
CVQKD systems and carefully monitoring the local os-
cillator are very important to confirm the security of the
heterodyne protocol of CVQKD.
Additionally, we point out that, for simplicity, in this
paper we do not consider the imperfections of Bob’s ho-
modyne detector such as detection efficiency, electronic
noise and other excess noise etc. However, when tak-
ing these imperfections into account, Eve only needs to
slightly adjust her attacking parameters like η and T2 or
fake local oscillator’s intensity |α′LO|2, which thus is able
to hide her wavelength attack.
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